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Introduction
Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, authors of 
the report Turning Presence into Power: Lessons 
from the Eastern Neighbourhood, believe that 
in order to tackle the wave of revolutions in 
the South, Europe needs to consider its expe-
rience from the point of view of its engage-
ment with its eastern neighbours. Despite be-
ing the largest trading partner for most of the 
countries in the south, Europe does not exer-
cise much influence over the politics of the re-
gion. The EU did not succeed in transforming 
presence into power or, as the authors of the 
report write: “(into) the ability to achieve out-
comes, set the agenda and define what oth-
ers want.” They add: “EU power in the Eastern 
neighbourhood would mean that Brussels 
was increasingly able to nudge its neighbours 
towards more democracy and reforms and 
greater support for EU interests and values in 
the region.” The EU has not achieved most of 
its goals related to democracy and security. 
Moreover, it did not succeed in preventing 
negative tendencies among its eastern neigh-
bours.
According to Popescu and Wilson, the fol-
lowing structural problems lie behind this 
failure:
– Increasingly authoritarian and semi-authori-
tarian regimes in most of the neighbourhood 
states. Only the state of Moldova is more dem-
ocratic now than it was five years ago; 
– Emergence of a multi-polar world that al-
lows countries in the eastern neighbourhood 
to play “neo-Titoist” games of balancing be-
tween external actors: Russia, Turkey and even 
China; and
– EU’s own focus on the financial crisis and its 
own institutional reforms. 
In this situation, the EU should effectively in-
crease its own visibility and outreach with the 
public, business community and state institu-
tions in the eastern neighbourhood. It also 
needs to develop a transactional relationship 
with its eastern neighbours – in other words, 
clearly define its own interests and set tough 
conditions to its eastern interlocutors on is-
sues such as visa liberalisation.
The report by Popescu and Wilson was pub-
lished in 2011 by the European Council on 
Foreign Relations. The Stefan Batory Foundation 
and the European Council on Foreign Relations 
jointly published the Polish version of the re-
port soon after the English original.
Below the reader will find articles by Polish 
authors who discuss theses put forward by 
Popescu and Wilson.
The Batory Foundation organized a debate on 
the ECFR report on 19th July 2011. The audio 
recording of the debate can be found on the 
following website:
http://www.batory.org.pl/debaty/20110719.htm.
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Andrzej Brzeziecki
Western consumptionism 
and eastern authoritarianism 
Engaging in the discussion on Eastern Europe 
and suggesting that Brussels increases its ac-
tivity in the region, while all the attention of 
the EU is directed at the southern neighbours 
of Europe and at the crisis in EU Member 
States, is noble in thought but out of touch 
with reality.
The authors of the report Turning Presence 
into Power, Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, 
diligently point out many strengths and weak-
nesses of cooperation between the EU and 
the countries of the Eastern Partnership. They 
also suggest a number of actions which would 
“turn presence into power.” It is beneficial if 
one reads the ECFR report along with the pa-
per Integration or Imitation? The EU and its 
Eastern Neighbours by Katarzyna Pełczyńska-
Nałęcz, published in 2011 by the Center for 
Eastern Studies. The author criticises the EU 
Neighbourhood Policy severely, but also places 
much responsibility for the current situation 
on the political elites of the Eastern European 
countries. In addition, Pełczyńska-Nałęcz 
puts forward a revision of the EU neighbour- 
hood policy. 
The authors of both reports, and many other 
analysts, politicians and publicists, think that 
progressive integration of Europe and EU en-
largement to the east is desirable and achiev-
able. The problem is that this view is not the 
only reasonable opinion. It gets more chal-
lenging yet when one acknowledges that un-
like the post-communist countries which had 
already joined the EU, the countries of the 
Eastern Partnership do not think of EU integra-
tion as the only possible positive scenario. 
What comes instead, then?
Two concepts have recently gained popularity 
– “external integration” and “associated mem-
ber”. Both sound internally contradictory, but 
they do have a logic of their own. Both the 
elites of the Eastern Partnership countries and 
the elites of the EU employ them in discus-
sions. Perhaps they are related to the project 
of building a zone of stability, not entirely in-
tentional, but quite attractive for many. The 
zone could encompass countries tied to the EU 
by economic agreements, for which full inte-
gration will never be an option.
Today, the EU is most proactive about building 
relations with the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries through comprehensive free trade agree-
ments (where possible). Proponents of the 
slogan “economy first” claim that such an ap-
proach will naturally result in political and con-
stitutional changes in the Eastern Partnership 
countries. Well, not necessarily. Pressing for 
such an agreement with Yanukovych’s Ukraine 
with the hope that he will foster democra-
tisation of the country, while he puts his po-
litical opponents in jail, is a proof of either 
a certain foolishness or cynicism of European 
bureaucrats.
Until recently it seemed there are two ways for 
the countries of Eastern Europe – democrati-
sation and integration with the EU (that was 
good) or return to dependence on Russia (that 
was bad). As it turns out today, despite the 
passing of time, the “multi-vector policy” as the 
Ukrainians put it, or “Titoism” as Popescu and 
Wilson name it, is still a viable option. They are 
right. Titoism is en vogue again, though some 
thought it was a song of the past. They pass 
over one thing – that Western Europe quite 
likes Titoists, and would gladly see them take 
power, as they guarantee stability and (with 
the exception of Alexander Lukashenko since 
19th December 2010) good business.
Building the stability zone  
has many advantages 
First – from a geopolitical perspective – such 
a solution does not settle unequivocally wheth-
er the countries involved choose Russia or the 
West. This allows the Union to avoid an open 
confrontation with Russia, and sets the elites 
and societies of the Partnership countries free 
from a challenging dilemma. The Titoists men-
tioned by the authors of the report are ready 
(with the exception of Georgia) to pay tribute 
to Russia in order to have their rule approved. 
They could pay Russia a symbolic tribute, 
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recognizing its dominance in the region, ac-
cepting the existence of “russkiy mir” and 
Russian military bases on their territories 
(Armenia even considers having the Russian 
military base in Gyumri a guarantee against 
Azerbaijan’s attack). Russia continues to offer 
some benefits in exchange for this “illusion of 
an empire”. The Partnership countries are also 
ready to pay Europe a tribute in tangible terms 
in exchange for a standard of living offered 
by the West to all those who can financially 
afford it. 
Second, the economic integration, even if par-
tial – by means of signing comprehensive free 
trade agreements with WTO member states 
– will positively affect EU markets.
Third, it sanctions the principle “my home is 
my castle”, which is convenient for the politi-
cal and financial elites of the Partnership coun-
tries. Access to credit and various programes 
is most certainly attractive. Do they need 
much more? Not really. They do not thirst for 
democracy and have no particular visa prob-
lems. Furthermore, the societies of the Eastern 
Partnership countries are not fully convinced 
that the European Union is the goal to be 
achieved if they must bear so many sacrifices. 
Such circumstances release the European Union 
from excessive concern about human rights 
and democracy. Politically motivated killings 
and interrupting public demonstrations will 
always evoke the Union’s outrage. However, 
a dubious electoral process or closing down 
another newspaper, television or radio chan-
nel fits well within EU’s margin of tolerance.
The countries of Eastern Europe created a hy-
brid way of life – wild capitalism (albeit with 
a considerable system of allowances) with no 
or limited democracy. In other words, the prin-
ciple is: get rich, no matter how. Low wages 
are compensated by a black market, piracy and 
smuggling. Western consumptionism and east-
ern authoritarianism coexist well together.  
Popescu and Wilson rightly notice the authori-
tarian tendencies in the Eastern Partnership 
countries. The question is whether the EU 
elites agree with them that this phenomenon 
needs a countervailing force. The failure of the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine and an increas-
ingly authoritarian rule by Mikheil Saakashvili 
in Georgia seem to confirm that authoritarian-
ism is a fact of life which one needs to learn 
to accept. Such an attitude is characteristic not 
only of the cynical “old” Europe. Let us just take 
a look at Poland that organized a recent sum-
mit of the Presidents of the United States and 
Ukraine, which was a specific legitimization of 
antidemocratic changes taking then place in 
Ukraine. And it was not an isolated case when 
democracy took a back seat. Although for dif-
ferent reasons, already the former president of 
Poland Lech Kaczyński strove to revitalize re-
lations with authoritarian Azerbaijan and be-
friended the president of Georgia despite the 
fact that the latter was destroying Georgian 
democracy reborn after 2003. The leaders of 
Eastern Europe do not consider that these 
gestures create obligations on their part, but 
rather that they confirm acceptance. They are 
not blind either – if the West strikes deals with 
Russia and China, why should they care about 
democratic standards? 
From this perspective, the EU does not have 
to revise its policy or even increase its pres-
ence, let alone turn it into power. Why should 
it? More or less authoritarian leaders will 
guarantee that beyond the eastern frontier of 
the Union there will be territories which will 
never pose any direct threat but will instead 
be decent economic partners. While skilfully 
juggling with regulations, the EU will be able 
to recruit from those territories cheap labour 
force or cheap energy (the production of which 
will not be restricted by environmental regula-
tions), while remaining richer and better de-
veloped and therefore producing luxury goods 
– and it will always find enough rich people in 
eastern countries to sell those goods to.
And what about the fact that this kind of 
a “deal” is made above the heads of the peo-
ple in those countries? It is hard to argue that 
this should bother the EU Commissioners. 
Obviously, this scenario is harmful for the na-
tions of Eastern Europe. However, can it be 
easily explained that it is also harmful for the 
citizens of the European Union? Surely not, par-
ticularly at times when anti-immigration and 
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anti-foreigner sentiments are on the rise. It 
is in the interest of EU citizens to safeguard 
their prosperity and not to bother with the 
Ukrainians, Belarusians or Armenians.  
How can this be prevented? If the EU really 
thinks that political and not just economic in-
tegration with the East is in its interest, which 
– again – may not be obvious for everybody, 
it needs to get ready for a long march and in-
deed drastically revise its current policy. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy should 
have a more selective character; the Eastern 
Partnership should be a more diversified pro-
grame, it should assume “different speeds” 
and stimulate competition among participant 
countries. In the end, the countries of the 
Eastern Partnership also have different views 
when it comes to the European Union. Some 
of them are not interested in a membership 
at all. 
That is why countries like Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine should be prioritized, so that the 
societies of the remaining countries see what 
they lose as a result of their own inaction or 
through their elites’ fault. Only in those three 
countries the social uprisings (Georgia 2003, 
Ukraine 2004, and Moldova 2009) led to the 
revision of elections or a change in power. 
This shows they have a significant potential for 
changes.  
In Moldova – due to the size of the country, 
but also because its elites and the society are 
ready – it would be easy to reach tangible re-
sults and visible improvement in the living 
standards of its inhabitants. In Ukraine, there 
is still some democratic potential which could 
stop authoritarian tendencies. Georgia, as the 
authors of the report admit, is most advanced 
institutionally in the transformation. Compared 
to Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is also a coun-
try with a broad spectrum of civil freedoms. 
Moreover, it remains in good relationships 
with those two countries antagonistic toward 
each other and can provide them with a shin-
ing example.  
To conclude, first the EU needs to focus on 
Moldova’s development to make it an example 
of a success story within the Eastern Partnership 
and a template to follow for the societies of 
Ukraine and Georgia, so that these countries 
stop slipping down the slope of authoritari-
anism. Second, not only their economies but 
also the democratic tendencies in Ukraine and 
Georgia need to be encouraged and strength-
ened. Under the current conditions, all profits 
will anyway go to those in power.
Real and easily visible (due to geographical 
proximity) changes will be more attractive 
to the societies of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Belarus rather than some instructions from 
a distant Brussels.
Within the European Union, in turn, we need 
an initiative explaining to the citizens that 
Eastern Europe is also Europe. There are some 
problems with understanding that, as illustrat-
ed by the example of the Eastern Partnership 
founding document.
Translation Katarzyna Snyder
comments»
Bartosz Cichocki 
in cooperation with 
Dominik Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak
Eastern Partnership –  
get it while it’s hot
A clear indication to a perspective of a future EU 
membership will allow the Eastern Partnership 
to take advantage of an opportunity to trans-
form from a neighbourhood policy into an en-
largement policy. Should that not be the case, 
the initiative launched in 2008 by Poland and 
Sweden will remain limited to development 
support, and the history books will take a note 
of it as the EU’s merely political gesture toward 
its eastern neighbours. 
 
The report by Nicu Popescu and Andrew 
Wilson correctly interprets a sense of acceler-
ating political and social processes in Europe’s 
immediate neighbourhood at the turn of 2010 
and 2011. The authors of Turning Presence into 
Power. Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood 
understood some basic lessons from the subse-
quent crises in Belarus, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
Libya and Syria (and soon probably also from 
the crises caused by unilateral Palestinian ac-
tions, as well as the Azeri-Armenian conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh): the cost of bringing 
back peace significantly exceeds the cost of 
preventing destabilisation.
Popescu and Wilson’s call to raising the level 
of ambition in the EU Neighbourhood Policy is 
twice as valuable because it is:
– Supported by hard arguments,
–  Branded by a well known EU research 
centre, and
–  Timely: the EU Member States have just 
started pondering proposals for changes 
in the Neighbourhood Policy submitted 
by the European Commission and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Catherine Ashton in the document A New 
Response to a Changing Neighbourhood.1
1 A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A Review 
of European Neighbourhood Policy. Joint Communication 
by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
This overall positive appraisal will not be 
changed by doubts regarding stronger and 
weaker emphasis in the discussed report. First 
and foremost, the content of the report seems 
to convey an undue longing for a lost epoch 
of enlightened empires and the colonies they 
civilised. Popescu and Wilson are not the only 
ones mesmerized by the colours of those times 
and it is a positive thing. When – citing Joseph 
S. Nye – the ECFR experts define the desired 
strength of the EU as “the ability to achieve 
outcomes, set the agenda and define what 
others want”, they in fact describe an image of 
Brussels which, like some ancient Rome (fourth 
in a row?), through its general-governors in the 
European Commission, tells the peoples inhab-
iting the shores of the Dnieper and Dniester, 
the slopes of Ararat and the Białowieża wood-
land what they should do, and the peoples 
gratefully carry it out. 
Meanwhile, EU relations with its European 
neighbours are based on an economic and 
trade policy which is entirely up to the 
European Commission. And the Commission 
is not eager to apply geopolitical criteria, be-
cause this would pose a threat to the com-
munity approach it is standing for. There is 
no acceptance for “politicising” the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in the Member States 
either, as this would mean giving up more 
power to the European Commission. It is char-
acteristic of Popescu and Wilson to go straight 
from generally deliberating a lack of the EU’s 
power to concrete technical and trade solu-
tions such as incorporating the countries of 
the Partnership into a common air space and 
reducing roaming fees and bank provisions. 
Paradoxically, the ECFR experts have less faith 
in Schumann’s model “from technological to 
political rapprochement” than Russian experts. 
In response to the EU’s dialogue with its east-
ern neighbours about creating comprehen-
sive free trade zones, Moscow fast tracked its 
activities towards incorporating Ukraine into 
a Russian-Kazakh-Belarusian customs union. 
Russians understand well that should their 
neighbours adopt Western legal and techni-
cal standards, the reconstruction project of 
Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, 
Brussels, 25th May, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu.
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Russia’s exclusive influence over the former 
USSR territories would be finished. 
It is worth noting that the authors of the afore-
mentioned A New Response... went even fur-
ther than Popescu and Wilson in their ingenu-
ity about transforming the EU’s presence into 
power. Their document assumes that the EU 
relations with neighbouring countries will be 
based on responsibilities taken by both sides 
and on a shared obligation to respect certain 
universal values and norms. The EU activities 
are expected to take a more individualistic ap-
proach to their respective neighbours, and the 
principle according to which the EU gives its 
support only under specific conditions is sup-
posed to be strengthened. The main criterion 
in the assessment is the pace of internal re-
forms, including democratisation. Therefore, 
the size of financial support from the EU for 
its neighbours after 2014 is to be contingent 
upon an individual appraisal of each neigh-
bouring country’s performance in the years 
2010–2012. The European Commission and 
the High Representative Catherine Ashton 
grasped – seemingly better than Popescu and 
Wilson – that the Arab “Spring of Nations” 
took Europeans by surprise because they were 
too focused on the system of power, including 
a state coercive apparatus, while underesti-
mating the importance of analysing the socio-
economic processes and in particular the ef-
fects of the Old Continent’s financial crisis on 
its surroundings. 
A New Response... meets Popescu and Wilson’s 
expectation that the EU increases its visibility 
because it proposes joint actions of the EU and 
its eastern neighbours on the international 
scene and tending to shared interests by ap-
plying the Common Security and Defence 
Policy mechanisms (cooperation in areas of 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and fighting terrorism). What is most in-
teresting, the proposal by Catherine Ashton 
and the European Commission contains a pro-
vision which indirectly refers to a perspective 
of the future EU membership of the Eastern 
Neighbourhood countries (the goals of the 
Eastern Partnership Initiative were equated 
with values contained in Article 49 of the Lisbon 
Treaty).2 This is a good omen before the Eastern 
Partnership Summit takes place in Warsaw in 
September 2011. A joint communiqué from 
this meeting should provide a strong incentive 
for continued efforts toward transformation 
by the EU neighbours. Without a clear road to 
the possibility of future EU membership not 
only will the Eastern Partnership Initiative lose 
a chance for an upgrade from a neighbour-
hood policy into an enlargement policy, but 
it will also gradually cease to be an effective 
development policy while remaining a merely 
political gesture of the EU towards its eastern 
neighbours.
We must not forget that the value of the 
European integration process lies in that it is 
not inevitable, infallible or irreversible. This 
was confirmed in the case of Greece, but also 
by France temporarily reintroducing control at 
the border with Italy and Denmark reintroduc-
ing border control on its frontier with Germany. 
It is true that the cases of post-Second World 
War Germany and Japan and of South Korea 
show that democracy and the free market can 
be installed from the outside. This, however, re-
quires dozens of years in spending to maintain 
tens of thousands of military contingents. If 
we can be gracious with mistakes made by the 
descendants of ancient Athens, why should we 
deny such understanding to the descendants 
of Colchis and the Steppe? Particularly because 
Popescu and Wilson’s revelations about the 
death of the rule of law and civil rights in the 
“colonies” of the Eastern Partnership are way 
exaggerated. And the report Turning Presence... 
provides the best proof for that. In this report 
one will find the thesis about democratisation 
of the Arab societies which had been, in some 
cases for 40 years, under one man’s dictator-
ships. In this context, some tendencies of the 
last 5 years in Ukraine or Moldova should not 
be treated as determining factors.
On the other hand, if the Arab “Spring of 
Nations” is to be compared – as Popescu and 
2 It states, among others, that every European state 
which respects values such as human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights 
including rights of the minorities, and commits to sup-
porting those values, may submit an application for EU 
membership. 
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Wilson suggest – to the fall of Communism in 
Central Europe, one needs to remember that 
the representatives of anciens régimes were 
back in power several years into the transfor-
mation. Also in the report Turning Presence... 
we can find diagrams showing Georgia’s fan-
tastic achievements in the field of good man-
agement and elimination of corruption. It is 
Tbilisi that offers support to the Polish expert 
missions in Tunisia, not the other way round. 
While evaluating the perspective for democ-
racy in the neighbouring countries of the EU, 
one should consider the security dimension. In 
the case of the Arab states, the security aspect 
involves remaining cautious due to signals of 
the rising strength of Islamist extremists. In 
the case of the Eastern Partnership countries, it 
involves forbearance toward symptoms of frus-
tration over losing the colonies by an empire 
quite different to the Austro-Hungarian one. 
As it turns out from reading Turning Presence..., 
Popescu and Wilson got attached to compari-
sons with Tito’s Yugoslavia3 when describing 
actions of the Eastern Partnership countries, 
which allegedly use the proximity of EU/NATO 
and Russia to draw as many benefits from it 
as possible. However, those countries are rath-
er bending over backwards so that none of 
their actions and intentions toward one of the 
sides provokes the other side’s outrage. That 
is why Ukraine officially gave up on the idea 
of joining NATO only to intensify its practical 
military cooperation with the countries of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. The case is similar with 
Yerevan’s decision regarding the extension of 
the agreement over Russia’s military presence 
in Armenia. 
Russia is consistent about strengthening its 
offensive potential within its military units lo-
cated in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and was 
highly determined when it negotiated with 
Kiev the prolongation of an agreement on sta-
tioning its Black Sea Flotilla in Crimea. These, 
as well as the pace and the scale of moderni-
sation of the Russian army (including cyclical 
ZAPAD manoeuvres at the NATO borders) under-
mine Wilson and Popescu’s thesis that Russia 
3 See Andrew Wilson, Nicu Popescu, European and 
Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood, London 
2009.
abandoned hard power tools and reverted to 
soft power in the context of its relations with 
the neighbours. The latest spy scandal involv-
ing president’s Mikehil Saakashvili’s person-
al photographer is just a cherry on top. The 
consolidation of executive power in Georgia, 
Ukraine and Belarus, criticized by the ECFR 
experts, is simply an answer to the existential 
threat from the outside. 
An abating factor in Popescu’s and Wilson’s 
“process” are their intentions. An excessively 
critical description of the political and eco-
nomic situation in the Eastern Partnership 
countries is a means to advocate an in-
crease in EU’s ambition vis-à-vis the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. The case is similar with their 
analysis of the EU bureaucracy engagement in 
the development of the Eastern Partnership. 
Popescu and Wilson focus their attention on 
remarks by an anonymous EU bureaucrat and 
come to a conclusion that Brussels has “no 
heart” for its eastern neighbours. Yet they do 
realise very well that the level of EU engage-
ment is indicated not by subjective emotions 
but by measurable progress in negotiating 
specific agreements. In the case of Ukraine 
it seems very realistic that negotiations on 
the EU Association Agreement will be con-
cluded by the end of 2011 and signed in 2012. 
A comprehensive free trade zone agreement 
will be an integral part of this document. 
The EU-Ukraine accord on a simplified visa 
regime and readmission was signed in 2007. 
In November 2010, a Plan of Action on libe-
ralisation of a visa regime was adopted. In the 
beginning of September 2011, the European 
Commission will announce the evaluation re-
sults of the first stage of implementation of 
the Plan by Ukraine. An agreement on the 
European Energy Community was signed with 
Kiev in 2010. If we continue to describe in a 
similar spirit the state of relations between 
the EU and the respective Eastern Partnership 
countries, we will come to more optimistic 
conclusions about the level of Brussels’ en-
gagement (and presence and power) in the 
East. Plus, aside from Brussels there are also 
the national capitals, forgotten in the text by 
Popescu and Wilson. The realization of “east-
ern” interests by the respective EU Member 
States which in bilateral relations apply tools 
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unavailable to the EU as a whole (e.g. politi-
cal foundations cooperating both with public 
administration and with the NGOs) is a neces-
sary element to be evaluated in any appraisal 
on the presence and power of a united Europe 
in its neighbourhood. Suffice to mention two 
out of many initiatives: a Warsaw conference 
of donors for Belarus in February 2011 and 
formation of the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian 
battalion. 
Wilson and Popescu rest their sceptical assess-
ment of the EU Neighbourhood Policy poten-
tial among others on showy but substantively 
groundless comparisons of statistics concern-
ing the participation of Bangladesh and the 
EU in international peacekeeping missions. 
Aside from the fact that the bad shape of the 
Transnistrian crisis – contrary to the situation 
in Lebanon and in many African states – does 
not pose a threat of genocide or civil war, the 
underdevelopment of EU peacekeeping mis-
sions in the former USSR territories is not a re-
sult of weak EU crisis management policy only. 
There are two other important factors at play: 
lack of cooperation with Eastern Partnership 
countries in the area of security policy (which 
is dealt with by one of the priorities of the 
Polish Presidency 2011) and lack of relations 
on this matter with third parties who have an 
interest in the region (Russia, Turkey).
The report takes into account a broader in-
ternational context of the EU Neighbourhood 
Policy, and even if individual pieces of the puz-
zle can be interpreted differently, this wider 
view provides another reason for which read-
ing the latest, the previous and the (hopeful-
ly) future reports by Wilson and Popescu not 
only is enjoyable, but should be obligatory. 
In conclusion: the presence and power of the 
European Union in the eastern neighbourhood 
is not in such a bad a shape that it could not 
be improved.
Translation Katarzyna Snyder
The opinions presented in the text are not the 
official position of the Bureau, but private views 
of the author and co-authors.
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Andrzej Szeptycki
The European 
Neighbourhood Policy  
has a logic of its own
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is char-
acterised by two weaknesses – a low level 
of engagement by EU Member States in the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Southern 
Caucasus (also in the countries of the eastern 
and southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea) 
and low effectiveness of EU activities in these 
regions. According to Nicu Popescu and Andrew 
Wilson, the latter problem, at least in part, 
comes as a result of the former one. In reality, 
the situation is much more complex. Both phe-
nomena are certainly related, but their interde-
pendence has an intricate character. Moreover, 
these two are not entirely incidental: one can 
say that the European Neighbourhood Policy 
has a logic of its own. 
Frailty of outcomes
The very first question one needs to ask is: What 
is the eastern (and southern) neighbourhood 
region from the EU perspective? If we look at 
the EU as a rising power, or more provoking-
ly as an empire1, the neighbouring countries 
can be perceived as the European peripheries, 
which are not a part of the system’s core, yet 
remain dependent on it. Such a statement does 
not provoke much resistance when speaking 
of the Mediterranean countries. The ENP is but 
one EU initiative directed at the region (oth-
ers include “5+5”, the Barcelona Process, Union 
for the Mediterranean, etc.), which are openly 
classified by some as postcolonial2. In the case 
of the eastern countries, the situation is less 
obvious since the EU has never been tradition-
ally engaged with that part of the continent. 
At the same time, some of the new Member 
1 Term popularized by Jan Zielonka (Europa jako impe-
rium. Nowe spojrzenie na Unię Europejską, Warszawa 
2007), who gave it a meaning different from the tradi-
tional one.
2 See Miles Kahler, Europe and its “‘Privileged Partners’ 
in Africa and the Middle East”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 1982, vol. 21, Issue 1/2, pp. 199–226.
States, and Poland in particular, have a rich his-
tory of such engagement. 
It is characteristic of a periphery that it devel-
ops according to the templates imposed by the 
centre, while retaining a different quality. In 
the case of traditional empires, the main coer-
cive instruments were political and military; in 
the case of modern forms of domination, the 
instruments are legal and financial, and these 
provide the means the EU uses to build up 
and consolidate its influence and power. The 
Central European countries “had to” accept 
the Union’s standards – i.e., the whole of the 
acquis communautaire – counting on financial 
assistance from the EU and, more broadly, the 
perspective of stabilization and prosperity as-
sociated with EU membership. In turn, at least 
formally, they became rightful co-participants 
of the European empire. The peripheries stand 
no such chance. 
The EU suggests to the neighbouring countries 
certain political (democracy, human rights, 
etc.) and economic (partial integration with the 
common market within the framework of an 
enlarged free trade zone) solutions while offer-
ing more or less measurable benefits (limited 
financial help, visa liberalisation). These solu-
tions are not bad a priori. Nonetheless, their 
authors tend to underestimate the role of local 
circumstances and overestimate European ex-
periences and current EU interests. As the post-
colonial school of thought would put it, the EU 
is trying to impose on the countries of Eastern 
Europe and Southern Caucasus its own model 
of development, fully convinced that it is uni-
versal and should be introduced as a part of 
a mission to civilise – a sentiment well known 
to the Europeans. The EU disregards – or per-
haps tries to disregard – some crucial problems 
of the region such as frail national identities 
of some neighbouring countries or their de-
pendence on Russia. This is well illustrated by 
the EU approach to post-Orange Revolution 
Ukraine. Viktor Yushchenko was (moderately) 
welcomed as a democrat, but he lost in the 
eyes of Europe when he attempted to imple-
ment a nation-building policy having for its 
basis, inter alia, the heritage of the Ukrainian 
Revolutionary Army. While not disregarding 
a multitude of mistakes made by the “orange” 
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politicians one needs to remember that delib-
erate actions on the part of Russia also contrib-
uted to their failure. Yet these hostile actions 
continued to go unnoticed by the EU, which la-
belled subsequent natural gas crises as “trade 
disputes”. Instead, it is the EU’s own interests 
that are crucial in designing its neighbourhood 
policy. The Ukrainian agricultural sector pro-
vides a good example. A sector essential to the 
whole Ukrainian economy has been acknowl-
edged only to a limited degree in the free trade 
zone agreement between the EU and Ukraine. 
The reason for this was protection of European 
producers. Someone may point out that the 
EU has to acknowledge its own interests and 
that is true. However, it is good to keep in mind 
that politics of raison d’etat rarely goes hand in 
hand with effective help for others. 
The EU is trying both to convey (impose) cer-
tain standards toward its neighbours and at 
the same time undertake action to retain their 
peripheral character. And it is not only about 
a visa regime or disqualifying future EU mem-
bership for its eastern neighbours. It is main-
ly about little knowledge of those countries 
and lack of any broader action to change it. 
The eastern neighbours, contrary to Turkey 
for example, take no part in the Erasmus pro-
gramme, which enables 200,000 students an-
nually to work and study abroad3. The eastern 
neighbours are of little interest to a European 
reader and publisher. A resident of France 
or Germany can choose from fivefold more 
publications on Poland than on Ukraine (not 
to mention other eastern countries). In both 
countries, there are more books available on 
Morocco than on the EU’s largest neighbour4. 
This situation results in Eastern European coun-
tries being perceived through a stereotypical 
and simplified lens, often focused on current 
political and socio-economic problems. From 
the EU perspective they are, in this sense, on 
a similar level with postcolonial countries. 
The centre states, in this case the European 
Union, not only perceive the peripheral coun-
3 Data from: http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-
learning-programme/doc80_en.htm.
4 Personal estimates on the basis of www.amazon.de 
and www.amazon.fr. German data includes publica-
tions in foreign languages.
tries as poorer, weaker and less developed. 
They also accept the status quo. Their part-
ners’ weakness allows for interference in their 
internal affairs and for imposition of solutions 
favourable to the strong countries (such as 
asymmetrical solutions adopted as a part of 
the wider free trade zone). It allows for circum-
scribing cooperation only to the areas chosen 
by the centre. Relative backwardness and un-
derdevelopment of the periphery are, in the 
long run, the sine qua non for maintaining the 
dominant role of the centre. Such was the case 
with the United States and their zone of influ-
ence in Latin America. It is so in the case of 
China and their neighbours (North Korea and 
Burma). Emancipation of a periphery leads to 
deterioration of an empire due to the lack of 
hard and soft power in the hands of the centre 
(the Communist bloc) or because of a neces-
sary redefinition of their mutual relationship 
(transatlantic relations). From the centre’s 
perspective a benevolent dictator, who en-
gages in pragmatic cooperation with stronger 
partners while counting on personal benefits 
(Hosni Mubarak), is a more convenient part-
ner than a reformer who wants to redefine 
bilateral relations (Mohammad Mosaddegh). 
Bringing this back to the earlier example of 
Ukraine: Yushchenko, the Orange Revolution 
hero, a rather honest (though naive and inef-
fective) supporter of Ukraine’s EU membership, 
was in reality a problem for Brussels. Viktor 
Yanukovych, the pragmatic “neo-Titoist”, de-
spite limiting democratic standards in Ukraine, 
is a man with whom – quoting Margaret 
Thatcher – one can do business.
Frailty of engagement
The above analysis allows for a better under-
standing of the EU’s reluctance to engage 
more in the eastern neighbourhood. First, one 
needs to consider general reasons, external 
to the EU’s relations with its European neigh-
bours, such as enlargement fatigue, a long 
and drawn out institutional reform process, an 
international financial crisis and internal euro 
zone problems, or finally the recent political 
changes in North Africa.
However, from the perspective of this discus-
sion, determinants related directly to the ENP 
are more interesting and more important. 
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The EU, or at least some of its Member 
States, steer clear from being accused of over- 
engagement or, one could say, even expansion 
in the region. Such opinions were expressed 
in Russia after the launch of the Eastern 
Partnership initiative. In this sense Popescu 
and Wilson are right when they claim that it 
was easier for the EU to engage in neighbour-
hood policy towards Central and South-Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s, because it had no compet-
itors there. Additionally, the EU Member States 
that place more importance on relations with 
the Mediterranean neighbours are reluctant to 
have the Union engage in the East. From the 
political perspective, most certainly countries 
like France care about strengthening the EU’s 
position in Eastern Europe and the Southern 
Caucasus (it suffices to recall the French atti-
tude during their EU Presidency when the new 
Ukraine-EU agreement assumed an associative 
character and Nicolas Sarkozy actively, though 
with mixed effects, engaged in solving the 
Russia-Georgia dispute); that said, financially, 
every batch of money transferred to those in 
the East is a batch of money lost by those in 
the South. 
Finally – returning to the question about the 
lack of effectiveness of the EU policy in the 
East – the EU seems to be afraid of a change 
of status quo in the region or even of any at-
tempt at it. A firm engagement of the EU in 
the region, should it bring about any effects, 
would force EU Member States to face a num-
ber of challenges. The Arab revolutions, de-
spite being a positive development, resulted 
in very tangible problems such as migration 
pressure. Still, from the EU perspective the po-
litical transformations in Maghreb are of lim-
ited significance because nobody is question-
ing a thesis that they are “the neighbours of 
Europe” and not “the European neighbours”. 
Meanwhile, a hypothetical successful politi-
cal and economic transformation of Eastern 
Europe and – to some extent – the Southern 
Caucasus would open anew the question 
about the borders of the European Union. It 
would moreover confront EU Member States 
with the need of significant financial support 
for its eastern neighbours just as it happened 
in the 1990s in the case of Central European 
countries, or with the necessity of unequivo-
cal counter-action against Russia’s ambitions 
in the region. It seems unlikely that in current 
circumstances the EU would be able to stand 
up to such a challenge. 
The second hypothetical scenario, one that is 
more likely but at the same time more pessi-
mistic, assumes that the European Union would 
strongly engage politically and financially in 
the East, yet the initiative would likely bring 
about few results – a similar experience to 
that of Poland in the aftermath of the “Orange 
Revolution”. Poland explicitly supported 
(at least declaratively) the new Ukrainian gov-
ernment and their allegedly pro-European aspi-
rations. After that, it became gradually clearer 
that the expectations we had for Ukraine were 
mislead, and the “project Ukraine” (recalling 
the title of a book by Marek Ziółkowski) stood 
no chance for implementation in the form it 
initially had. Surely few politicians would be 
willing to repeat the scenario and that explains 
European reticence toward the East. 
In conclusion, one can say that the frailty of 
EU engagement in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
and the related low effectiveness come as 
a result of both the benefits stemming from 
the peripheral character of the neighbour-
ing countries and the challenges arising from 
a more decisive attempt to change the status 
quo in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus. 
The European empire needs a wild frontier, 
which – despite merely limited control exer-
cised by the centre – provides for strategic out-
skirts and a sense of security.
Translation Katarzyna Snyder
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Marcin Wojciechowski
Presence is power
The report Turning Presence into Power con-
tains a multitude of precious data and obser-
vations characterising the relations between 
the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries. 
Above all it takes note that the EU is a much 
more important economic partner to all of 
them, save Belarus, than Russia. This is a tan-
gible basis and at the same time a justification 
for the EU’s engagement in the region. A fact 
well known to the experts, but still worth pop-
ularising and emphasising.
The presence of the EU in the region is not 
only a civilisational mission, a continuation 
of unification of Europe divided by the Iron 
Curtain after the Second World War, a pro-
motion of the European values, or a way to 
provide a stable and predictable neighbour-
hood. All those matters are important, but 
the main and basic reason for the existence of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership is simply a cold economic 
calculus. The former USSR countries became 
ever more important export markets for the 
states of the Union. With time, as the legal 
norms and market rules get adjusted to the EU 
standards, these countries may become a nat-
ural location for investment and expansion for 
EU businesses. It is important to highlight this 
fact considering that some sceptics think of the 
Eastern Partnership as of a kind of charity on 
the part of the European Union. To my mind 
it is rather a sort of a well-remunerated term 
deposit, an investment fund, or even a capital 
accumulation program, should one decide to 
use banking terminology. 
The authors of the report – Nicu Popescu 
and Andrew Wilson – are right to point out 
the regress of democratisation in the Eastern 
Partnership countries over the last year. 
Moldova is one exception. What is striking, 
however, is the one-sidedness of their judge-
ment and putting all the countries into one pot. 
I will refer to that later. The diagnosis of three 
main reasons for the lack of effectiveness of 
the EU policy toward the Eastern Partnership 
countries, however, is accurate: authoritari-
anism on the rise in those countries, a multi-
polar world in which the Eastern Partnership 
countries have more options for their foreign 
policy, and finally a weak engagement of the 
Union in the Neighbourhood Policy. 
The authors’ practical suggestions on how 
to increase the EU presence in the region are 
also reasonable. A liberalised visa regime, 
cheaper flights, lower roaming and telephone 
connection prices and facilitating the Eastern 
Partnership students to come to the EU are un-
doubtedly the simple and effective long-term 
ways to promote the EU in the region. 
Another way is to develop cooperation with 
Border Guards and the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs of the Eastern Partnership countries 
– a necessary step considering the perspective 
of visa liberalisation or abolition of visas, most 
likely in the case of Ukraine. Cooperation is 
needed also in the context of the organization 
of joint events such as Euro 2012, or alleviation 
of the effects of natural catastrophes, such as 
floods, which are quite frequent on the EU-
Ukraine and EU-Moldova borders.
 
What is disappointing about the report is its 
automatic approach to all six countries of 
the Eastern Partnership as if they were one. 
Meanwhile, they can be divided into catego-
ries. Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine are coun-
tries that have explicit European ambitions and 
are more democratic than the rest of the post-
Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan have no such 
ambitions, are under authoritarian rule, and 
their elites in power have no intentions of 
changing that, even rhetorically. A much em-
ployed in the report motive of “neo-Titoist 
games” played by the elites of the former USSR 
territories relates mainly to the latter three 
countries. It is these countries that treat their 
relations with the EU instrumentally, including 
their participation in the Eastern Partnership. 
They use their European relations as a tool 
in games with the former regional leader, 
Russia. It is best illustrated by the example of 
Belarus which has been playing this game for 
years. Even though everybody knows it, Minsk 
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continues to reap benefits from interchange-
ably approaching the West and Russia, with af-
finity toward the latter. 
The only way to disable the eastern partners 
from engaging in neo-Titoist games with the 
EU is a consequent application of the princi-
ple “more assistance for more reforms” and, 
by way of analogy, “less for less”. This should 
become an official rule of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy both in the East and 
in the South. Inasmuch as the principle “more 
for more” has been officially written into the 
EU documents, the principle “less for less” can 
only be applied as a matter of analogy. For now 
it has been demonstrated only in the sanctions 
against Belarus for stifling democracy, forging 
elections and repressing the Belarusian oppo-
sition. The question is why the EU decides not 
to undertake similar steps toward Armenia or 
Azerbaijan which, considering the level of de-
mocracy, are not much different from Belarus, 
even after taking into account their Caucasian 
specificity. Selective application of the rules 
toward the Eastern Partnership countries, but 
also towards Russia which is an important 
point of reference to them, will obscure the im-
age of the EU as one that applies clear criteria 
for cooperation and refers to transparent rules 
of the game. It is important because Russia, 
who feels threatened by the EU presence in 
the region, keeps on promoting the Union’s 
image among the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries as a dishonest player who applies double 
standards.
Most likely because it was written a couple of 
months ago, the report does not take note of 
progress in negotiations on the EU-Ukraine as-
sociation agreement. Despite other negative 
tendencies present in that country, like the 
persecution of Yulia Tymoshenko or the pro-
tracted arrest of the former Interior Minister 
Yuri Lucenko, Kiev grew to be the region’s 
leader in its cooperation with the EU. It is an 
interesting tendency showing that if not just 
smooth words but also political will of the lo-
cal elites are tuned into cooperating with the 
Union, then success is possible even in the dif-
ficult post-Soviet reality. If by the end of the 
year Ukraine succeeds in negotiating the asso-
ciation agreement with the EU, it will provide 
a very interesting example to be replicated in 
other countries of the Partnership. One could 
say even today that after years of suspense, the 
new rulers of Ukraine and their business back-
up decided that strategic rapprochement with 
Ukraine is in their interest. 
Let us not be deceived that the administration 
of president Viktor Yanukovych made such 
a decision due to idealistic reasons, as it was 
done years before by the countries of Central 
Europe ruled by former dissidents and intel-
lectual groups related to them. Yanukovych’s 
people probably figured that in the long 
run, economic ties with the EU will pay off, 
strengthen their wealth, and enable them to 
sell their capital, banks and businesses gained 
in various ways to the European partners and 
for higher European prices. Today these as-
sets have a lower price due to Ukraine’s iso-
lation from the Common European Market. 
Even if such realistically painful motivation for 
rapprochement with the EU may offend the 
European ethical standards, it is well worth to 
take advantage of. In the end, in times of finan-
cial crisis, it is pragmatism and mutual interest 
that should stimulate development of interna-
tional relations. Idealism and civil society will 
be following the path taken by capital. Indeed, 
one of the important reasons for the EU acces-
sion by the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe in 2004, aside from dreams of histori-
cal unification of Europe, was eagerness of the 
big western companies to expand markets in 
which they could operate. Now this principle 
may be applied in reverse. 
In any case, the success of the Eastern 
Partnership depends on whether the ruling 
elites in the participating countries will get en-
gaged in the project. In at least three Eastern 
Partnership countries – Georgia, Moldova and 
Azerbaijan – the societies are interested in 
getting closer to Europe. In this case I would 
not place much trust in unreliable polls, but 
rather I would look at certain electoral, po-
litical and cultural trends. It is a huge success 
of the EU presence in the region that in at 
least three eastern countries Europe is truly 
en vogue, and their politicians cannot disre-
gard that trend. For now they often leave it at 
words, but as the example of Ukraine shows, 
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if words get mixed with an authentic politi-
cal will, things start moving forward. We are 
witnessing a similar process in Moldova ruled 
by a pro-European government for two years. 
The recent local elections in this country show 
that the government’s attitude along with an 
increase of interest on the part of the EU may 
generate a very pro-European thinking within 
the society. 
The ECFR report dealing with Eastern 
Partnership is rather conservative. Usually, 
such is the virtue and a professional habit of 
analysts. Yet some more optimism in assess-
ment of at least some countries of the region 
would be, to my mind, beneficial. By the same 
token, getting overly excited and excessive-
ly optimistic regarding the potential of the 
Eastern Partnership would not be appropriate 
either. There is a Polish saying: “If you don’t 
have what you like, then you like what you 
have”. And such is the case with the Eastern 
Partnership. It is the best of all existing tools 
of influencing the situation in the post-Soviet 
countries. And the only one available in the 
present conditions. It needs to be fully satu-
rated with content: on one hand, increasing 
the EU’s engagement, an option pointed out 
by the authors of the report; on the other 
hand, getting the eastern elites interested in 
the project. Even if one needs to use subtle 
bribery, such as making them aware that rap-
prochement with Europe will bring them ben-
efits, also the tangible ones. 
Translation Katarzyna Snyder
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